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There is widespread concern that housing-price bubbles have formed in
several countries, fueled by high demand that stems from low interest rates,
the spread of lower-payment mortgage products and portfolio shifts from stocks
to real estate. Since 1999, for example, home prices have jumped more than
110 percent in the U.K. and nearly 60 percent in the United States (Chart 1).
1
This issue is important beyond housing markets, because U.S. consumer
spending has been bolstered in recent years by mortgage refinancing and
households withdrawing equity from their homes.
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For several years, house price appreciation has
outstripped income growth in the United States,
with most of the price gains concentrated in the
East and West. While moderate increases in house
prices often reflect, and contribute to, a region’s
economic and financial health, the steepness of
recent price increases has raised concerns. In par-
ticular, it has been suggested that borrowers,
emboldened by rising house prices, are turning to
riskier types of mortgages in order to qualify for
the debt necessary to purchase increasingly expen-
sive homes, thereby potentially setting the stage
for repayment difficulties in the future.
We examine mortgage characteristics in differ-
ent regions to assess the extent to which high
appreciation in house prices has been associated
with the use of riskier types of mortgages. While
mortgage products have evolved to include
numerous available features, our analysis focuses
on the distinction between traditional fixed- and
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), given the avail-
ability of consistent regional data on traditionalhave made it easier and less expensive
to do both. Largely by making housing
wealth more liquid, these innovations
have made consumption more sensitive
to housing wealth.
3 So a weakening of
home prices can affect consumption—
not just construction—beyond what tra-
ditional estimates indicate. This is sug-
gested by the experience of the U.K.,
which has had several, more pro-
nounced swings in home prices than the
United States.
4
In an earlier article, I showed how
an overvaluation of home prices was
emerging in some parts of the United
States.
5 Subsequent increases have only
heightened concern that possible price
weakness could slow the economy by
dampening construction and consumer
spending. The current article focuses on
making sense of elevated housing prices
by analyzing pricing patterns using more
recent data and drawing on more recent
research to interpret the risks they pose.
It also looks at policy implications, in-
cluding macroeconomic risks from possi-
ble weakness in housing prices and fac-
tors that might trigger home-price
weakness.
6
Is There a Bubble? 
While there is no generally accepted
definition, “bubble” usually describes a
substantially overvalued asset price that
is in danger of collapsing. As a working
definition, substantially overvalued here
is a price 20 percent or more above his-
torical norms. The threshold is based on
the usual definitions of bull and bear
stock markets as having price changes of
20 percent or more from a peak or trough.
Have U.S. Home Prices Fallen as Fast
as Financial Asset Prices? Stock bubbles
are marked by sustained price increases
as the bubble builds, followed by more
rapid price declines. For example, U.S.
stock prices rose for almost a year lead-
ing up to the one-day plunge of Oct. 17,
1987. In contrast, over the past 30 years
national home prices have trended
upward and at worst, roughly flattened
out temporarily (Chart 2). Moreover, in
the few relevant U.S. cases, regional
home-price overvaluations were slower
to unwind than stock-price overvalua-
tions. For example, home prices in the
New England, Mid-Atlantic and Pacific
regions were marked by rapid rises in
the mid- to late 1980s, followed by
slower paced declines. This asymmetry
likely reflects factors that lead owners to
delay selling homes at a loss. Selling a
house is more costly, takes longer and
involves more personal complications
than trading stocks. And some owners
cannot afford to take a loss. As a result,
stocks are far more liquid than homes,
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percent for those traded on the New
York Stock Exchange versus 4 percent
on homes.
Are U.S. Home Prices Overvalued
Enough to Qualify as a Bubble? Account-
ing for the impact of interest rates on
home prices, U.S. housing prices ap-
pear—on average—to be overvalued by
less than 20 percent. But in some mar-
kets, the overvaluation may be higher.
Of the various gauges for assessing
prices, this article focuses on the ratio of
home prices to rents. Rents, in this case,
are the cash flow homes could generate,
and the price-to-rent ratio is much like a
stock price-to-earnings ratio.
7
Relative to rents, U.S. home prices
are 38 percent higher than in 1983
(Chart 3). When home prices rose
sharply in the Northeast and the Pacific
states in the mid- to late 1980s, the
national ratio rose, only to reverse in the
1990s, when prices in these regions stag-
nated or fell. Since 1999, the price-to-
rent ratio has surged, suggesting that
home prices could fall or rents could
jump. But the risk that home prices
could fall is smaller when recognizing
that high home price-to-rent and high
stock price-to-earnings ratios imply a
low real rate of cash returns, which can
be sustained if real interest rates remain
low. 
To assess if U.S. home prices are
overvalued, I estimated the relationship
between the home price-to-rent ratio
and a measure of real mortgage rates
through 2000 and used it to construct
estimates of equilibrium home prices
since then. Chart 4 shows the percent-
age-point gap between actual and equi-
librium prices. During the period from
1983 through the end of 2000 that is
used to estimate equilibrium, home
prices generally stayed within 10 percent
of their estimated equilibrium values.
Prices surged to 11.5  percent above his-
torical norms by second quarter 2005,
implying they were overvalued but not
enough to qualify as a bubble.
8 How-
ever, because the measure of real mort-
gage rates is based on a user-cost-of-
housing concept that employs lagged
price appreciation to adjust nominal rates
for inflation, the 11.5  percent figure for
second quarter 2005 assumes housing
prices would continue appreciating at
about 12 percent. If instead it is assumed
the increases would settle down to
around 5 percent—about the long-run
pace of income growth—the degree of
overvaluation would exceed 20 percent.
9
These estimates should be viewed
cautiously and seen as shedding light on
qualitative, rather than quantitative, con-
ditions, given the short data sample,
noise in most asset prices, and difficulty
measuring prices and rents. For exam-
ple, the repeat-sales-price index may
overstate prices, partly owing to opti-
mistic home appraisals used in refinanc-
ing mortgages.
10 Also, the measure of
home rents has been criticized.  
And estimates of equilibrium home
prices are imprecise, reflected by the
large gap between the two-standard-
deviation lines (in blue) around the
overvaluation estimates, which imply
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ferent from a 10 percent threshold
(delineated by the dashed black lines),
commonly used to define stock market
corrections. This imprecision reflects dif-
ficulty with identifying an equilibrium
price using a short sample period that
covers one and a half housing-price
cycles. In addition, equilibrium values
may have risen in ways not captured by
the variables used to estimate equilib-
rium prices. For example, mortgage
innovations have made housing a more
liquid, and thus more attractive, asset. In
addition, the demand for owning more
than one home has recently increased.
For these reasons, prices may not be as
overvalued as Chart 4 suggests. 
The Case Against Overvaluation. Per-
haps the strongest case against U.S.
home prices being overvalued can be
made using the National Association of
Realtors’ (NAR) national affordability
index for all buyers, which is not low
(Chart 5). This index measures actual
median income relative to the income
needed to qualify to buy a median-
priced home with 20 percent down at
the average conventional mortgage rate.
In recent years, median income has been
about 130 percent of that needed to
qualify but fell to about 120 percent in
the second quarter of 2005, largely due
to a jump in housing prices and, to a
lesser extent, slightly higher mortgage
interest rates. If rates rose a full point, at
current prices and incomes this index
would decline to about 110 percent, well
below the range of recent years.
In addition, the national affordability
index ignores that many homebuyers do
not make 20 percent down payments.
Indeed, 25 percent of homebuyers made
no down payment in 2005, according to
the NAR. Also, some buyers pay sub-
prime mortgage rates that are above the
rates the affordability index uses. More-
over, many purchases are for second
homes (13 percent of 2004 home sales,
according to the NAR) or investment
homes (13 percent of mortgages for Feb-
ruary 2005 home purchases, according to
Freddie Mac, and 23 percent of 2004
home sales, according to the NAR). The
index, in contrast, assumes households
have one mortgage.
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The index also overlooks the rising
use of creative financing, such as inter-
est-only loans (17 percent of mortgage
originations in the second half of 2004,
according to the Mortgage Bankers Asso-
ciation), which do not require owners to
build up equity by paying down princi-
pal. And there are risks from the advent
of option adjustable-rate mortgages,
which give borrowers the option of pay-
ing principal and interest, interest only
or an amount smaller than the accrued
interest, which increases indebtedness
via negative amortization.
Turnover Suggests Speculation.
Another sign of possible overvaluation is
the large rise in home turnover, which
could reflect speculative activity and
households buying out of fear that prices
will be much higher in the future. Turn-
over, which can be tracked by the ratio
of units sold to the number of existing
units, recently jumped above its normal
3 to 4 percent range (Chart 6). Likely
reflecting swings in housing demand,
faster turnover has been accompanied
by home-price increases that have out-
paced inflation. It is disturbing that
recent turnover and relative home-price
inflation are at levels last seen in the late
1970s. 
Making Sense of 
Regional Patterns
Divergences in regional home prices
reflect different supply and demand con-
ditions.  The left panel of Chart 7 depicts
areas like the Northeast and Pacific
states, where, due to tight supplies of
building lots, increased housing demand
from low mortgage rates is resulting in
large price increases and little construc-
tion. Recent research has found that
home-price movements are dominated
by swings in land, rather than structure,
costs.
12 The right panel depicts areas like
much of the noncoastal South, where,
due to plentiful supplies of building lots,
increased demand results in smaller
price increases and more construction. 
Research has found that tougher
zoning, reduced supplies of vacant land
and longer commutes have made land
supply less elastic in the Northeast and
Pacific Coast areas since the early
1970s.
13 As a result, regional home prices,
particularly for land, are more apt to
diverge, with the risk of overvaluation
largely in tight land-supply areas like
coastal cities in the Northeast and the
Pacific states. Nationally, increases were
large enough to raise the land compo-
nent of existing home prices to about 46
percent of constant-quality home prices
in third quarter 2003, well above the 38
percent average that had been seen
since 1970.
14
Home prices are again outpacing
rents, mainly in areas of tight land sup-
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mid- or late 1980s, only to retreat in the
early 1990s (Chart 8). In the Northeast
(New England plus the Mid-Atlantic
states), the declines in the early to mid-
1990s did not fully reverse earlier
increases. Similarly, price-to-rent ratios in
coastal cities like Boston, New York and
San Francisco rose quickly in the mid- or
late 1980s but slowly and only partially
fell back in the early 1990s (Chart 9). Re-
cently, price-to-rent ratios have again
jumped in land-tight cities on the Pacific
and Atlantic coasts but have risen less in
inland cities, like Atlanta and Dallas.
It is plausible that as they become
wealthier, people will be willing to pay
more to live near the ocean, suggesting
that recent price run-ups in coastal cities
may not fully unwind. Nevertheless, it is
troubling that affordability has plunged
in many coastal cities, with recent esti-
mates from Wachovia Bank and the
National Association of Home Builders
showing that the share of residents who
can afford a median-priced home has
fallen to about 5 percent in San Diego
and Los Angeles and less than 10 percent
in San Francisco and New York City.
Implications for Monetary Policy 
High real estate prices have several
implications for monetary policy. Al-
though signs of home-price overvalua-
tion are seen mainly in the Northeast,
Pacific states and Florida, these are eco-
nomically important areas. In addition,
there are emerging signs and anecdotal
reports that price appreciation is spilling
over into nearby areas, as people either
migrate to less expensive places or buy
investment property to diversify out of
particular markets. 
Macroeconomic Risks. The main
macroeconomic risk from high home
prices is not that a housing crash could
trigger a recession but that the impact of
a new economic headwind could be
amplified if it triggered home-price
declines. For example, a headwind that
pushed up mortgage interest rates could
weaken home prices, which in turn
could dampen construction by a bit
more than what historically based esti-
mates would indicate. 
Another risk is that home prices may
no longer aid consumption as much as
in recent years. The combination of
higher home values and financial inno-
vations has enabled owners to refinance
mortgages and tap their equity using col-
lateralized loans that have much lower
interest rates than in the past.
15 For exam-
ple, households are now more willing to
refinance their mortgages at a given in-
terest rate savings because refinancing
entails lower fixed costs and fewer has-
sles than in the past.  In addition, house-
holds have become more able to tap
home wealth by cashing out equity when
refinancing, using home equity lines and
not fully using the proceeds from selling
prior homes as down payments on sub-
sequent ones. 
One reason mortgage equity with-
drawals may affect consumption in ways
generally unseen in the past is that hous-
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gains. These withdrawals have jumped
recently, at times exceeding $400 billion
at an annual pace and amounting to
about 5 percent of income. Through late
2003, mortgage interest reductions from
refinancing (as a percentage of income)
also surged. Tentative econometric re-
sults suggest that in 2003, long-run con-
sumption was boosted 1.5 to 2 percent-
age points by equity withdrawals and,
together with mortgage refinancings, by
roughly 5 percentage points beyond that
suggested by traditional housing wealth
effects.
16
What Could Trigger Home-Price
Declines? Given these macro risks and
evidence that home prices may be over-
valued in some key markets, it is worth-
while to touch on what factors could
trigger home-price declines. While prices
appear overvalued in areas of tight land
supply, it is important to note that eco-
nomic developments, particularly those
affecting job growth and interest rates,
tend to drive housing markets, rather
than the reverse. 
Home prices are vulnerable to job
market weakness, especially when eco-
nomic growth slows and a headwind
could tip the economy into recession.
Also relevant are the risks of regional
recessions that could weaken home
prices in the Northeast and West. Indeed,
in the early 1990s unemployment rose
more in those two regions than in the
South and Midwest. Higher housing costs
made the Northeast and West less com-
petitive and more vulnerable to shocks,
such as the defense cutbacks that hurt
Southern California in the early 1990s.
Weak job markets in those areas likely
hurt home prices in the early and mid-
’90s. While current labor market condi-
tions are good, high housing costs in the
Northeast and the Pacific states may
undermine these regions’ ability to gen-
erate jobs. 
Another factor that could trigger de-
clines in real estate prices is a possible
jump in mortgage interest rates, which
may have become more difficult to pre-
dict. One reason is the unusual behavior
of long-term interest rates, which have
only recently moved up despite 11 in-
creases in the federal funds rate from
2004 through September 2005. Possible
factors include the global savings glut,
increased bond investor confidence that
the Federal Reserve will keep inflation
low and the subdued pace of global eco-
nomic recovery.
Mitigating Factors. Fortunately, some
factors mitigate the risks posed by high
home prices. First, the impact of possibly
higher mortgage rates on U.S. home prices
is limited by the use of fixed-rate mort-
gages, which cushion homeowners from
higher  payments. And while use of ad-
justable-rate mortgages has risen in re-
cent years, ARM use has not increased as
much as in earlier short-term interest-rate
cycles, despite the impression created by
many media reports (Chart 10). Never-
theless, ARM use is high and, as in ear-
lier cycles, has jumped in some high-cost
markets. 
Another mitigating factor is that the
unemployment rate will likely remain low
because the economic expansion will
probably continue. In addition, the limits
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suggest that most construction is not in
high-cost areas most vulnerable to price
declines. Furthermore, U.S. policymakers
would likely have time to react because
home prices tend to rise faster than they
fall, and refinancing and equity with-
drawal effects on consumption appear to
be more medium-run than short-run,
according to new research.
17 Also helping
in this regard is that home price-to-rent
ratios in the Northeast and California
tend to rise faster than they fall, with 
past downward corrections mainly owing
to the combination of stagnant home
prices and rising rents. Furthermore, his-
torical norms may overstate how much
home prices may be overvalued. 
The United States Is Not Alone
The behavior of housing markets in
the U.K. is an interesting example, partly
because there are longer time-series data
on that country, and home prices appear
more overvalued there than in the United
States. Indeed, the ratio of home prices
to rents has jumped more in the U.K.,
which appears to be undergoing its third
or fourth housing-price cycle since the
late 1960s (Chart 11). Home-price swings
there differ from those in the United
States in being more pronounced and as
flexible when falling as when rising.
The greater volatility in the U.K.
price-to-rent ratio likely stems from two
structural differences between the real
estate markets there and in the United
States.
18 First, U.K. housing demand tends
to be more interest-rate sensitive be-
cause mortgages there are generally much
more adjusted to market rates. Indeed,
70 percent of mortgages have rates that
lenders can adjust within one year, and
balloon mortgages make up many of the
rest.  In contrast, Freddie Mac data sug-
gest that only about 30 percent of out-
standing U.S. mortgages are subject to
adjustment for short-term interest rates.
A second difference is that the U.K. has
a smaller supply of building lots, so
housing-demand swings affect prices
more. In this respect, the U.K. may be
akin to the land-supply-restricted North-
east and Pacific Coast regions of the
United States. By contrast, building lots
are plentiful in much of the U.S. South
and Midwest. 
Another difference is that the Bank
of England tightened sooner than the
Federal Reserve in the most recent inter-
est rate cycle. Probably reflecting this and
structural market differences, U.K. home
prices, which have jumped 113 percent
this decade, may be close to topping out,
whereas U.S. prices, which have risen 59
percent, are still going up (see Chart 1).
Outlook
As of second quarter 2005, U.S.
housing prices appeared elevated rela-
tive to fundamentals. However, it was
unclear whether there was a national
housing bubble because of uncertainty
about whether estimates of overvalua-
tion were large and precise enough to
warrant such a designation. Neverthe-
less, several indicators suggest that home
prices are frothy, particularly in some
regions.  For example, home prices in the
Northeast and Pacific states seem over-
valued, based on historical norms. In
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prices have nearly doubled in the past
five years, a magnitude hard to justify
based on fundamentals. The main risk
high prices pose is that they could
amplify the effects of an economic head-
wind, in which case consumption could
slow if mortgage refinancing and equity
withdrawal activity decrease or flatten.
Fortunately, high home prices are mainly
in areas with little construction, and our
limited experience suggests that U.S.
policymakers would have time to cush-
ion the macroeconomic impact of price
declines. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable
uncertainty about how much home
prices may be overvalued. The United
States has a short track record with con-
strained supplies of building lots in some
regions and with today’s new mortgage
practices.  In addition, the increased liq-
uidity of housing wealth and greater
demand for second homes could raise
equilibrium values to an unknown
extent. A limited experience with re-
gional home-price weakness also makes
it unclear how much declining home
prices would affect the economy in high-
priced areas. Such uncertainties warrant
more research and monitoring of resi-
dential real estate markets and their
effects.
—John V. Duca
Duca is a vice president and senior econ-
omist in the Research Department of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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